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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 Appellants, who are oil producers, sold their product to 
SemGroup L.P. and affiliates (including SemCrude L.P.), 
midstream oil and gas service providers and the Debtors in 
the underlying Chapter 11 cases.  SemGroup sold oil to and 
traded oil futures with Appellees, downstream oil purchasers.  
The producers took no actions to protect themselves in case 
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of SemGroup’s insolvency.  The downstream purchasers did; 
in the case of default, they could set off the amount they owed 
SemGroup for oil by the amount SemGroup would owe them 
for the value of the outstanding futures trades.  Accordingly, 
when SemGroup filed for bankruptcy, the downstream 
purchasers were paid in full while the oil producers were paid 
only in part.   
 Because the oil producers did not take precautionary 
measures to ensure payment in case of SemGroup’s 
insolvency, all they have to rely on are local laws they 
contend give them automatically perfected security interests 
or trust rights in the oil that ended up in the hands of the 
downstream purchasers.  But the parties who took precautions 
against insolvency do not act as insurers to those who took 
none.  Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary 
judgment in the downstream purchasers’ favor.   
I. BACKGROUND 
SemGroup’s Two Businesses  
 SemGroup L.P. and its subsidiaries (jointly and 
severally referred to as “SemGroup”) provided “midstream” 
oil services.  It purchased oil from producers and resold it to 
downstream purchasers.  It also traded financial options 
contracts for the right to buy or sell oil at a fixed price on a 
future date.  At the end of the fiscal year preceding 
bankruptcy, SemGroup’s revenues were $13.2 billion.    
 Two of SemGroup’s operating companies, SemCrude, 
L.P. and Eaglwing, L.P., purchased oil from thousands of 
wells in several states and from thousands of oil producers, 
including from Appellants, producers located in Texas, 
Kansas, and Oklahoma.  The producers act on behalf of many 
parties who have interests in the oil at the wellhead.  These 
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interest owners include the person or entity who owns the 
land in fee simple, and thus owns the rights to the minerals.  
That person or entity transfers the mineral rights to an oil 
company through a lease.  The company holds the “working 
interest”—the right to drill and sell the oil from the leased 
land.  The working-interest owners appoint an operator to 
work the well.  Most of the producers in this appeal are 
owners of working interests or operators.    
 After purchase, SemGroup moved the oil via trucks 
and pipelines and stored it in major aggregation centers in 
Oklahoma, Kansas, and elsewhere.  Per industry custom, 
SemGroup purchased the oil on credit, paying for it on the 
20th day of the month following the sale.  For example, oil 
purchased in January would be paid for on February 20.   
 SemGroup always paid the producers for the oil in full 
until the bankruptcy filing.  It then resold the product to 
downstream purchasers, including to Appellees, J. Aron & 
Company and BP Oil Supply Co., both large oil distributors.  
SemGroup expressly warranted to the downstream purchasers 
that it sold them oil “free from all royalties, liens, and 
encumbrances.”   See, e.g., Conoco General Provisions § B, 
J.A. 2505.  Again, per industry custom the downstream 
purchasers bought the oil on credit, with payment due the 
20th of the following month.  J. Aron and BP had no 
communication with the thousands of oil producers from 
whom SemGroup purchased the oil and only knew of the 
existence of some of the larger producers.  J. Aron and BP 
dispute whether they even purchased any of Appellants’ oil 
and contend that Appellants cannot trace the oil they sold, as 
it was mixed with millions of barrels of oil from innumerable 
other producers.   
 Until the bankruptcy filing, J. Aron and BP paid in full 
for the oil they bought.  BP also sold oil to SemGroup, so 
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when payment was due they would net out their obligations—
i.e., if BP bought $10 million from SemGroup and SemGroup 
bought $8 million from BP, then BP would just pay $2 
million to SemGroup.   
  In addition to midstream oil services, SemGroup also 
traded oil futures with J. Aron and BP.  This trading strategy 
lead to SemGroup’s insolvency.  Essentially SemGroup bet 
that the price of oil would drop, while J. Aron and BP wanted 
to secure a low price of oil in the event that prices would rise.  
SemGroup would win the bet if the oil price dropped while J. 
Aron and BP would win if the price rose.  The (simplified) 
mechanics are as follows.  
 SemGroup sold what are known as call options.  In 
exchange for an upfront premium, the purchaser of the call 
option received the right to purchase oil at a specified price 
and date.  To illustrate, if in December J. Aron purchased the 
right to buy 10,000 barrels of oil at $50 a barrel on March 1, 
but the market price that date was $45 a barrel, that option 
was worthless because J. Aron could buy oil at a cheaper 
price on the market; the $50 buying right did not save J. Aron 
money.  SemGroup therefore would make money: it received 
the upfront premium J. Aron paid for the option, but did not 
end up losing the bet because it would not have to sell oil at 
less than market price.  Conversely, if the market price on 
March 1 was $55 a barrel, J. Aron would be “in the 
money”—SemGroup would have to sell J. Aron 10,000 
barrels of oil at $50 a barrel, $5 below the market rate.  
SemGroup thus would lose $50,000 dollars on the option 
because, if J. Aron did not have the buying right, SemGroup 
could have sold that oil on the market for the going price of 
$55.  These options did not “physically settle.”  That is, 
SemGroup would not actually sell these oil barrels; it would 
just owe J. Aron $50,000.    
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 SemGroup’s gambling strategy was in stark contrast 
with hedging oil prices.  To hedge a drop in the price of oil, 
SemGroup could have acquired put options—the right to sell 
oil at a specified price.  This would protect them against price 
drops while still allowing them to take advantage of selling at 
high oil prices.     
 As it turns out, SemGroup was a bad gambler.  Oil 
prices rose throughout 2007 and 2008.  Its CEO believed that 
eventually oil prices would drop.  So each time SemGroup 
lost money on these options, rather than realize the financial 
loss, it would sell more options to cover the loss.  This is 
referred to as “rolling” in the industry, and is essentially 
doubling down on a lost bet.  For example, if SemGroup lost 
$1 million on the March 1 trade, it would resell new options 
and collect $1 million in new premiums, thus betting that the 
price of oil would drop on a date in the future.  SemGroup 
thought that, if it kept “rolling” these options, eventually the 
price of oil would drop and all the options would be 
worthless.  If that happened, SemGroup would have acquired 
all of these upfront premium payments at no cost.  This 
doubling-down strategy had a downside, however.  Rolling 
options greatly increased SemGroup’s exposure to future 
losses.  By July 2008 it was exposed to a potential $2.8 
billion loss if the option bets did not pay off.   
Liquidity Problems, Setoff Rights, and the Bankruptcy 
Filing 
 SemGroup had to pledge cash collateral to margin 
accounts to cover its exposure on the options.  The cash in 
these margin accounts assured the trading counterparties that 
SemGroup could pay for any loss on the options.  The margin 
exposure was calculated by the “mark to market” method—
the amount SemGroup would owe the counterparty if the 
option liquidated that day.  As SemGroup’s exposure on these 
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options increased, so did its margin requirements.  Eventually 
it ran out of funds to meet those margin obligations, causing 
its bankruptcy.  
 Before the bankruptcy, J. Aron and BP started buying 
oil from, and trading options with, SemGroup.  In November 
2007, J. Aron entered into a master agreement governing its 
relationship with SemGroup, and in April 2008 BP entered 
into a similar arrangement.  Under the agreements, in the 
event of SemGroup’s default J. Aron and BP could set off any 
outstanding amount due for oil purchases with the amount 
owed on options trades.  Until SemGroup’s default, J. Aron 
and BP always paid in full for their oil purchases and never 
exercised a setoff right.      
 Through the late spring and early summer 2008, oil 
prices kept rising and SemGroup continued losing on its 
trades.  It failed to receive additional financing to meet its 
ever-increasing margin obligations.  On July 17, 2008, as set 
out in their agreement, J. Aron asked SemGroup for adequate 
assurance of performance and that SemGroup meet certain 
credit-support thresholds.  When SemGroup did not respond, 
J. Aron called a default.  The parties thus set off the 
outstanding amounts due.  J. Aron owed to SemGroup $435 
million in oil purchases, and SemGroup owed to J. Aron $345 
million in outstanding options trades.  Accordingly, J. Aron 
owed $90 million, the net amount after the oil and options 
were set off.   
 On July 22, 2008, soon after J. Aron called the default, 
SemGroup filed for bankruptcy.  This triggered a default as to 
BP, so it also set off the prepetition amount it owed 
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SemGroup for oil less the amount SemGroup owed it for the 
options trades.  Consequently, BP owed $10 million.1 
Bankruptcy Proceedings 
 Following its Chapter 11 filing, more than a thousand 
oil producers were unpaid.  Oil producers, purchasers, and 
SemGroup’s lending banks inundated the Bankruptcy Court 
with adversary proceedings and motions to distribute 
SemGroup’s assets.  The Court established omnibus 
procedures to determine the producers’ rights and priorities 
versus the banks, with a single adversary proceeding for each 
state where the producers sold product.  The relative priority 
of the producers and downstream purchasers was preserved 
for later rulings.   
 In those rulings, the Bankruptcy Court first held that 
the lending banks’ security interests in SemGroup’s assets 
took priority over any purported lien or trust rights granted 
under state law.  It certified appeals directly to our Court as 
matters of first impression, 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2), but the 
producers and lending banks settled while the appeals were 
pending.  By stipulation, the producers reserved their right to 
pursue their claims against the downstream purchasers and to 
appeal these rulings in the future.      
 Meanwhile, J. Aron and BP filed separate adversary 
proceedings where they sought to tender the amount they 
owed to the bankruptcy estate in exchange for a release from 
all liability.  The producers also filed nearly 30 separate 
lawsuits against J. Aron and BP in state and federal courts.  
These suits were transferred to the Bankruptcy Court for 
                                              
1  There is no contention before us that the Bankruptcy Code 
prohibited these setoffs.  See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b) 
and 553. 
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resolution.  In September 2009, it confirmed the 
reorganization plan by which J. Aron and BP’s tendered 
funds were turned over to the producers for full payment of 
oil delivered between July 2 and July 21, 2008.2  The 
tendered funds also paid off 12.9% of the amount owed for 
oil sold from June 1 to July 1, 2008.    
 After a discovery process involving more than 100 
parties, over 150 depositions, and millions of pages of 
documents, J. Aron and BP moved for summary judgment 
against the Appellant-Producers (hereafter, the “Producers”).  
The Bankruptcy Court filed proposed findings of facts and 
conclusions of law recommending summary judgment in 
favor of J. Aron and BP.  It concluded in exceptional depth 
and easily understood language that there was no evidence of 
fraud and that J. Aron and BP purchased the oil from 
SemGroup free of any purported security interest either as (1) 
buyers for value, or (2) as buyers in the ordinary course.  In re 
SemCrude, L.P., 504 B.R. 39, 44 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013).  The 
District Court overruled the Producers’ objections to the 
Bankruptcy Court’s recommendation and adopted it.  In re 
Semcrude, L.P., No. 14-CV-41 (SLR), 2015 WL 4594516 (D. 
Del. July 30, 2015). 
Summary of Claims on Appeal 
 The Producers’ claims do not rely on bankruptcy law.  
They are based on state statutes and common law fraud.  The 
                                              
2 This followed from 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(9), whereby an 
allowable administrative expense includes “the value of any 
goods received by the debtor within 20 days before the date 
of commencement of a case under this title in which the 
goods have been sold to the debtor in the ordinary course of 
such debtor’s business.” 
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Texas and Kansas Producers argue that, under their states’ 
nonuniform amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code, 
they had perfected security interests in the oil they sold to 
SemGroup and J. Aron and BP took the oil subject to these 
interests.  The Oklahoma Producers bring separate claims 
derived from an Oklahoma statute they contend imposes an 
implied trust for their benefit.  They also claim to have an 
equitable interest in the oil proceeds J. Aron and BP took to 
set off the options debt.   
II. JURISDICTION 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review 
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  Yet the 
Producers argue that the District Court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction even though the confirmed Chapter 11 plan 
expressly provided for jurisdiction over this controversy.     
 The Bankruptcy Court determined that the proceeding 
before it was non-core,3 but both it and the District Court 
exercised jurisdiction because that proceeding was “related 
to” SemGroup’s bankruptcy case.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(c)(1)(“A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that 
is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case 
under title 11.”);  28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (“[T]he district courts 
shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil 
proceedings . . . related to cases under title 11.”).   
 The Bankruptcy and District Courts correctly 
determined that “related-to” bankruptcy jurisdiction exists 
here.   That is so where the adversary proceeding has any 
“conceivabl[e]” effect on the bankruptcy estate.  Nuveen 
                                              
3 In contrast to non-core, a core bankruptcy proceeding 
includes, among other things, estate administration, claims, 
plans, and debt discharges.  28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).      
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Mun. Trust ex rel. Nuveen High Yield Mun. Bond Fund v. 
WithumSmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283, 293 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(citing Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984)).  
All we ask is whether the “outcome could alter the debtor’s 
rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either 
positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon 
the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate.”  Id. at 
294 (quoting Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994).   
 Related-to jurisdiction—like other types of federal 
jurisdiction—is determined at the time of filing.  Id. (citing 
Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 
570–71 (2004)).  The Producers thus miss the mark by 
arguing that, because the plan has now been confirmed, the 
bankruptcy estates can no longer be affected.  See id. 
(“[C]onfirmation of a bankruptcy plan does not divest a 
district court of related-to jurisdiction over pre-confirmation 
claims.”) (citations omitted).   
 At the time of filing of these adversary actions and 
related Producers’ suits, which was prior to plan 
confirmation, the Producers’ claims unquestionably could 
have affected the bankruptcy estates.  Resolving these claims 
sets the competing rights among creditors to the estates’ 
funds.  Moreover, if the Bankruptcy Court had disallowed the 
setoff process (whereby J. Aron and BP set off the amount 
owed for the oil less what was owed on the options contracts), 
they might have had to return money to SemGroup’s estate.  
Accordingly, the Bankruptcy and District Courts possessed 
related-to jurisdiction, and we have jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 We exercise plenary review over a grant of summary 
judgment.  Rosen v. Bezner, 996 F.2d 1527, 1530 (3d Cir. 
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1993).  It is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the opposing party, “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.  
IV. ANALYSIS 
 As noted, the Texas and Kansas Producers rely on 
their states’ nonuniform amendments to the Uniform 
Commercial Code, which they argue give them automatically 
perfected security interests in the oil they sold to SemGroup 
that J. Aron and BP ultimately received.  We first conclude 
that the Producers do not have a perfected security interest 
even if Texas or Kansas law applied.  Accordingly, J. Aron 
and BP purchased the oil from SemGroup free of any lien as 
buyers for value.  U.C.C. § 9-317(b).   
 Next, we turn to these Producers’ fraud claim and 
agree with the Bankruptcy and District Courts that there is no 
evidence of fraud.  J. Aron and BP took precautions to protect 
themselves in case SemGroup became insolvent, but they did 
not defraud SemGroup’s other creditors.   
 To conclude, we address the Oklahoma Producers’ 
claims based on an Oklahoma statute they contend imposes a 
trust relationship between them and anyone who purchases 
their oil.  That interpretation lacks logic and is not supported 
by the statute’s text. 
A. The U.C.C. Claim 
 Because we must parse uniform and state-specific 
versions of U.C.C. Article 9 (the Article on security interests), 
it is helpful to explain briefly a few fundamental concepts.  A 
security interest is “an interest in personal property or fixtures 
which secures payment or performance of an obligation.”  
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U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35).  In other words, it is a lien on a piece 
of property that secures payment of a debt.  If the debt is not 
paid, the person who holds the security interest can repossess 
that property—i.e., take it in satisfaction of the debt.  The 
person who owns that security interest is called the “secured 
party.”   U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(73) (“‘Secured party’ means: (A) 
a person in whose favor a security interest is created or 
provided for under a security agreement, whether or not any 
obligation to be secured is outstanding.”).  The property 
subject to the security interest is called “collateral.”  U.C.C. 
§ 9-102(a)(12).  And a “debtor” is the person with an 
ownership interest in that collateral.  U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(28) 
(“‘Debtor’ means: (A) a person having an interest, other than 
a security interest or other lien, in the collateral, whether or 
not the person is an obligor. . . .”) (emphasis added).         
 The Producers contend that they sold the oil to 
SemGroup on credit subject to a security interest—that is, 
they retained a lien in the oil as long as SemGroup had not 
paid them for that oil, and if SemGroup did not pay for the oil 
the Producers could hypothetically repossess it.  The oil they 
sold here is the “collateral,” and SemGroup, who purchased 
the oil, is the “debtor.”  The Producers further assert that their 
security interests continued in the oil even after SemGroup 
resold it to J. Aron and BP.  See U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(1) (“a 
security interest or agricultural lien continues in collateral 
notwithstanding sale”).  Thus, J. Aron and BP received the oil 
subject to the security interest, and, because SemGroup did 
not pay the Producers in full, the Producers had the right to 
reclaim the oil from J. Aron and BP.  Accordingly, J. Aron 
and BP would have to return to the Producers the value of the 
oil used to set off options debt with SemGroup.   
 J. Aron and BP, however, contend that they took the 
oil as buyers for value and thus free of any security interest.  
See U.C.C. § 9-317(b) (“[A] buyer, other than a secured 
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party, of . . . goods . . . takes free of a security interest . . . if 
the buyer gives value and receives delivery of the collateral 
without knowledge of the security interest . . . and before it is 
perfected.”).  This defense is simple: if a security interest is 
not perfected,4 a buyer takes the property free of that security 
interest unless the buyer actually knew of the security 
interest.  As discussed below, we conclude that J. Aron and 
BP qualify as buyers for value.  To do so, we address whether 
(1) the security interests were perfected, (2) J. Aron and BP 
actually bought the oil or acquired it as secured parties, and 
(3) they knew the Producers’ security interests even existed.    
 1. Security interests were not perfected. 
 To perfect a security interest, in most instances a party 
must file a financing statement in the appropriate state office.  
See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (“[A] financing statement must be filed 
to perfect all security interests.”).  Here, the Texas and 
Kansas Producers did not file a financing statement or take 
any other steps to perfect their security interests.  Instead, 
they urge us to apply their states’ versions of the U.C.C. 
because they contain nonuniform amendments that the 
Producers argue give oil producers an automatically perfected 
security interest in the oil they produced.  See Tex. Bus. & 
Com. Code § 9.343 (“(a) This section provides a security 
                                              
4 The holder of a “perfected” security interest has much 
stronger recourse to enforce that interest against third parties 
than if the interest was not perfected.  Generally perfection 
comes into play to determine priority over conflicting 
interests in collateral:  perfected security interests have 
priority over unperfected security interests, and, as between 
conflicting security interests, the security interest perfected 
first has priority over interests perfected later.  See U.C.C. 
§ 9-322.     
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interest in favor of interest owners, as secured parties, to 
secure the obligations of the first purchaser of oil and gas 
production, as debtor, to pay the purchase price. . . . (b) The 
security interest provided by this section is perfected 
automatically without the filing of a financing statement.”); 
Kan. Stat. § 84-9-339a(a) (same); Kan. Stat § 84-9-339a(b) 
(“the security interest provided by this section is perfected as 
of the date of recording [the production of that oil]”).  But the 
Producers miss that, even if we were to apply Texas or 
Kansas law,5 we apply those states’ versions of Article 9, not 
just their nonuniform amendments in isolation.  See Tex. Bus. 
& Com. Code § 9.343(p) (“The rights of any person claiming 
under a security interest or lien created by this section are 
governed by the other provisions of [Article 9] except to the 
extent that this section necessarily displaces those 
provisions.”); Kan. Stat. § 84-9-339a(o) (same).    
  Texas and Kansas, along with every other state, 
adopted a key feature of revised U.C.C. Article 9: its uniform 
choice-of-law provision.  So even starting with Texas’s or 
Kansas’s U.C.C., we begin with this rule, which states that 
“while a debtor is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of 
that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or 
nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in 
collateral.”  U.C.C. § 9-301(1); see Tex. Bus. & Com. Code 
§ 9.301(1) (same); Kan. Stat. § 84-9-301(1) (same); see also 
                                              
5 The Bankruptcy and District Courts applied Delaware’s 
U.C.C. choice-of-law rules because that is the forum state.  
See, e.g., Robeson Indus. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & 
Indemn. Co., 178 F.3d 160, 164–65 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying 
choice of law of forum state in resolving adversary 
proceeding based on state-law claim).  We need not reach this 
issue for the purposes of this appeal because, regardless of the 
state, each has the same choice-of-law rule, U.C.C. § 9-301.     
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U.C.C. § 9-301 cmt.4 (“[T]he law governing perfection of 
security interests in both tangible and intangible collateral, 
whether perfected by filing or automatically, is the law of the 
jurisdiction of the debtor’s location, as determined under 
Section 9-307.”).     
 Here, as noted above, SemGroup is the debtor because 
it purchased the oil on credit subject to the Producers’ 
security interests.  SemGroup and its affiliates are registered 
in Delaware or Oklahoma.  U.C.C. § 9-307(e) (“A registered 
organization that is organized under the law of a State is 
located in that State.”).  Accordingly, the “local law of 
[Delaware or Oklahoma] governs perfection,” not Texas or 
Kansas law.  U.C.C. § 9-301(1).  Oklahoma and Delaware 
require perfection by filing a financing statement. Okla. Stat. 
tit. 12A, § 1-9-310; Del. Code tit. 6, § 9-310.  Because it is 
undisputed that the Producers never made such a filing, their 
interests are unperfected.    
 The only potential exception to § 9-301(1)’s debtor-
location rule is for as-extracted collateral.  See U.C.C. § 9-
301(4) (“The local law of the jurisdiction in which the 
wellhead or minehead is located governs perfection, the effect 
of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security 
interest in as-extracted collateral.”).   The Producers’ oil does 
not qualify for this exception because, for oil to be as-
extracted collateral, a debtor must have a preexisting interest 
in the oil before it is extracted at the wellhead.  See U.C.C. 
§ 9-102(a)(6) (“‘As-extracted collateral’ means (A) oil, gas, 
or other minerals that are subject to a security interest that: (i) 
is created by a debtor having an interest in the minerals 
before extraction; and (ii) attaches to the minerals as 
extracted; or (B) accounts arising out of the sale at the 
wellhead or minehead of oil, gas, or other minerals in which 
the debtor had an interest before extraction.”) (emphases 
added).  Here, SemGroup had no interest in the oil while it 
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was in the ground.  Only after the Producers extracted and 
sold it did SemGroup become involved.  
 The Producers nonetheless argue that these automatic 
perfection laws “necessarily displace” the choice-of-law rule.  
See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 9.343(p) (“The rights of any 
person claiming under a security interest or lien created by 
this section are governed by the other provisions of this 
chapter except to the extent that this section necessarily 
displaces those provisions.”) (emphasis added); Kan. Stat. 
§ 84-9-339a(o) (same).  But nothing about these automatic 
perfection laws “necessarily displace[s]” the rest of Article 9.  
Rather, these local laws apply when the debtor is located in 
Texas or Kansas, or where the debtor is so closely involved at 
the wellhead that it has some preexisting interest in the oil 
before it is extracted from the ground so that the oil 
constitutes as-extracted collateral.  U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1) & (4). 
 The Producers further rely on a provision referring to 
security interests created by the government.  U.C.C. § 9-
109(c)(3) (“This article does not apply to the extent that . . . a 
statute of another State, a foreign country, or a governmental 
unit of another State or a foreign country, other than a statute 
generally applicable to security interests, expressly governs 
creation, perfection, priority, or enforcement of a security 
interest created by the state, country, or governmental unit.”) 
(emphasis added).  An entity of Texas or Kansas government 
did not create the security interests.  Instead, the security 
interests were created by SemGroup purchasing oil from the 
Producers.   
 The Producers also argue that Delaware or Oklahoma 
perfection laws incorporate the automatic-perfection oil lien 
laws.  They rely on an Official Comment to a separate section 
of Article 9 (on buyer defenses) that generally mentions the 
existence of nonuniform amendments.  See U.C.C. § 9-320 
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cmt.7 (“Several [states] have adopted special statutes and 
nonuniform amendments to Article 9 to provide special 
protections to mineral owners.”).  This Comment recognizes 
that certain states might adopt special provisions to protect 
mineral owners; it does not automatically incorporate 
unspecified local laws.  Beyond that, a Comment to the 
U.C.C. does not supersede statutory text, and the Comment 
says nothing about overriding Article 9’s choice-of-law rules. 
 All told, the Producers misunderstand the burdens and 
uncertainty their U.C.C. interpretation would create.  
SemGroup resold oil from thousands of producers located in 
eight different states.  The downstream purchasers, including 
J. Aron and BP, had no dealings with this diverse group of 
producers, did not even know who these producers were, and 
were buying oil in bulk from storage centers, so they did not 
know which producers’ oil they received.  To determine 
possible conflicting security interests, instead of merely 
checking the filing records of the states of the entities they 
purchase from, downstream purchasers would have to 
discover the identities and locations of potentially thousands 
of producers with whom they have no contact.       
 Eliminating this type of uncertainty was of 
foundational importance to the U.C.C.’s simplified notice 
system.  Prior to the 2001 revisions of the U.C.C., parties 
normally had to search for financing statements wherever a 
debtor had collateral to know if anything was encumbered.  
See U.C.C. § 9-103(b)(1) (1995) (“Except as otherwise 
provided in this subsection, perfection and the effect of 
perfection or non-perfection of a security interest in collateral 
are governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the 
collateral is when the last event occurs on which is based the 
assertion that the security interest is perfected or 
unperfected.”).  Now the U.C.C. requires that a party check 
for filings in the debtor’s location and understand that locale’s 
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secured transactions laws.  See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt.4(c) 
(“This Article changes the choice-of-law rule governing 
perfection (i.e., where to file) for most collateral to the law of 
the jurisdiction where the debtor is located.”).   If the oil 
producers want to encumber the oil they sell to an out-of-state 
first purchaser, all they need to do is comply with the rules 
uniformly applicable throughout the country to all sellers of 
goods—file a financing statement in the state where that first 
purchaser is located.    
 In conclusion, under U.C.C. § 9-301(1), Delaware and 
Oklahoma law govern perfection.  Texas and Kansas’s 
nonuniform amendments to Article 9 do not save the 
Producers.  J. Aron and BP thus may qualify as buyers for 
value because the security interests the Producers may have 
claimed were not perfected.  See U.C.C. § 9-317(b) (buyer-
for-value defense only applies “before [the security interest] 
is perfected”).    
 2. J. Aron and BP purchased the oil from  
  SemGroup.  
 The second premise underlying the Producers’ claims 
is that J. Aron and BP did not buy the oil from SemGroup.  
Instead, under the parties’ setoff agreements, J. Aron and BP 
acquired oil as a secured party—they took it as collateral for 
the options trades—and thus did not give “value” for it.  See 
U.C.C. § 9-317(b) (“A buyer, other than a secured party, of 
. . . goods . . . takes free of a security interest . . . if the buyer 
gives value . . . .”).   
 The Producers mischaracterize J. Aron and BP’s 
business relationships with SemGroup.  J. Aron and BP did 
not acquire the oil because it was collateral for the options 
trades; they acquired it on credit per industry custom.  These 
purchases on credit—promises to pay—are more than 
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sufficient to satisfy the “value” requirement.  See U.C.C. § 1-
204 (“[A] person gives value for rights if the person acquires 
them . . . (4) in return for any consideration sufficient to 
support a simple contract.”).  And not only did J. Aron’s and 
BP’s promises to pay satisfy the value requirement, the 
purchases gave SemGroup a new, valuable asset—accounts 
receivable, or simply “accounts” for U.C.C. purposes.  See 
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (“‘Account’ . . . means a right to 
payment of a monetary obligation . . . (i) for property that has 
been or is to be sold . . . .”).  SemGroup’s accounts receivable 
were in turn used as collateral to secure its obligations to J. 
Aron and BP under the options trades.   
 To illustrate, when J. Aron and BP purchased oil on 
credit, SemGroup received IOUs from them.  These IOUs 
became SemGroup’s accounts.  In turn, J. Aron and BP 
contracted for a setoff right between SemGroup’s accounts 
and any amount SemGroup might owe J. Aron or BP for the 
options trades.  In the event SemGroup ended up owing them 
money on the options trades, J. Aron and BP would get their 
IOUs (the accounts) back.   
 Hence these IOUs served as collateral for the options 
trades, not the oil.6  J. Aron and BP received oil simply 
                                              
6 The accounts receivable created by the oil purchases were 
valuable to SemGroup, reducing its trading costs and 
increasing its liquidity.  For example, as part of its option 
trades with J. Aron, SemGroup had to post cash collateral to 
meet margin requirements based on its exposure to that entity.  
This relieved SemGroup from posting the required cash 
margin based on the amount J. Aron owed SemGroup for oil 
purchases.  To illustrate, if SemGroup had to post a $50,000 
cash margin, it could substitute that amount with the accounts 
receivable (meaning J. Aron’s IOUs) worth $50,000.  As a 
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because they purchased it.  Thus, because J. Aron and BP 
purchased oil from SemGroup and did not acquire it as 
secured parties, they meet this requirement of the buyer-for-
value defense.  See U.C.C. § 9-317(b) (“A buyer, other than a 
secured party, of . . . goods . . . .”).    
  3. J. Aron and BP did not have knowledge of 
the   Producers’ security interests.  
 Whether J. Aron and BP bought the oil “without 
knowledge of the security interest” is the only remaining 
disputed requirement.  We agree with the District Court that 
no reasonable factfinder could conclude that they had 
                                                                                                     
result of this arrangement, SemGroup could put its cash to 
other uses. 
 
 The accounts receivable also were valuable for the 
Producers and others that dealt with SemGroup.  The 
Producers’ security interests could have extended to 
SemGroup’s accounts receivable created by J. Aron and BP’s 
purchases.  See U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(2) (“a security interest 
attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collateral”); U.C.C. 
§ 9-102(a)(64) (defining “proceeds” to include “(A) whatever 
is acquired upon the sale, lease, license, exchange, or other 
disposition of collateral; (B) whatever is collected on, or 
distributed on account of, collateral. . . .”).  But the Producers 
do not assert their security interests in SemGroup’s accounts 
receivable, likely because their interests could have been 
subordinated to J. Aron and BP’s setoff rights.  See U.C.C. 
§ 9-404; see also 504 B.R. at 52.  The Producers could have 
contracted with SemGroup to ensure that these accounts 
would not be used as collateral for SemGroup’s options 
trading business, but they did not. 
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knowledge of the Producers’ security interests in oil.  Despite 
volumes of discovery, at most the Producers have produced 
indications of constructive knowledge (a reason to know), but 
U.C.C. § 1-202(b) requires “actual knowledge.”  
 SemGroup sold oil to J. Aron and BP per the industry 
standard Conoco General Provisions, which expressly 
disclaim the existence of any continuing security interest: 
“The Seller warrants good title to all crude oil delivered 
hereunder and warrants that such crude oil shall be free from 
all royalties, liens, encumbrances and all applicable foreign, 
federal, state and local taxes.”  J.A. 2505.  Some 15 Producers 
even used this Conoco warranty language in their sales to 
SemGroup, although those Producers now argue that it 
applied only to third-party liens, not the ones created between 
a Producer and the purchaser.   
 It is also undisputed that the Producers never 
communicated with J. Aron and BP about any subject, let 
alone a security interest.  Indeed, the Producers never took 
any steps to notify anyone about their purported security 
interest.  And despite massive document discovery and 
numerous depositions, there is no evidence that anyone at J. 
Aron or BP—or anyone else for that matter—knew about the 
claimed security interests.   
 Nonetheless, the Producers contend that we can 
reasonably infer actual knowledge because of testimony that 
J. Aron or BP (1) were aware of state lien laws, (2) knew of 
the existence of some of the Producers, (3) knew that 
SemGroup purchased the oil on credit from the Producers, 
and (4) were aware that SemGroup’s credit agreements with 
its lending banks carved out from the lending base those 
assets encumbered by “statutory Liens, if any, created under 
the laws of [various states].”  J.A. 9488-89.  This 
circumstantial evidence in no way shows that when 
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SemGroup resold the oil and expressly warranted that it was 
not encumbered by security interests, J. Aron and BP actually 
knew the truth was otherwise.  At most, this establishes 
constructive knowledge—that J. Aron and BP might have a 
reason to believe that some oil was encumbered by a security 
interest at some time.  But constructive knowledge does not 
defeat the buyer-for-value defense; only “actual knowledge” 
does.  U.C.C. § 1-202(b).   
 Thus J. Aron and BP did not have actual knowledge of 
any security interest in the oil they purchased and meet all 
other requirements of the buyer-for-value defense.  
Accordingly, they took the oil free of the Producers’ liens to 
the extent they even existed.7   
                                              
7 In light of this ruling, we need not reach the District and 
Bankruptcy Court’s determination in the alternative that J. 
Aron and BP took the oil free of the security interests as 
buyers in the ordinary course.  See U.C.C. § 9-320(a) (“[A] 
buyer in ordinary course of business . . . takes free of a 
security interest created by the buyer’s seller, even if the 
security interest is perfected and the buyer knows of its 
existence.”); see also U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(9) (the seller must be 
“in the business of selling goods of that kind”).  BP purchased 
oil from SemCrude, and it is undisputed that SemCrude was 
in the business of buying and selling oil and that it created the 
security interests when it purchased the oil from the 
Producers on credit.  After the Bankruptcy Court 
recommended summary judgment, however, the Producers 
belatedly argued that J. Aron cannot avail itself of this 
defense because it purchased oil from SemCrude’s parent, 
SemGroup.  Because the Bankruptcy and District Courts did 
not have the full opportunity to reach this issue, it is not clear 
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B. The Fraud Claims 
 The Producers’ fraud claims also fail.  They do not 
bring claims for fraudulent transfers under the Bankruptcy 
Code.  See 11 U.S.C. § 548.   Rather, they bring a common 
law fraud claim, contending that SemGroup did not intend to 
pay for the Producers’ oil, and J. Aron and BP participated in 
this scheme to defraud.   
 The Producers first argue that the District Court erred 
procedurally by granting summary judgment sua sponte on 
fraud because J. Aron and BP moved for summary judgment 
only as to the causation element of fraud.  Even if this were a 
“sua sponte” grant, the Producers knew they needed to show 
that their fraud claims should survive summary judgment and 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion.   
 District courts “possess the power to enter summary 
judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on 
notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence.” 
Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 280 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
326 (1986)).  “Notice” simply requires that “the targeted 
party ha[ve] reason to believe the court might reach the issue 
and receive[] a fair opportunity to put its best foot forward.’” 
Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 500 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations 
omitted).  Even if the “notice” requirement is not met, the 
grant of summary judgment is only reversible if there is 
prejudice.  See id. at 507. 
                                                                                                     
to us whether SemGroup (the parent) was in the business of 
selling oil or whether it was involved in creating the security 
interests.  Accordingly, out of an abundance of caution, we do 
not reach this issue.   
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 Here, the Producers had the full opportunity to oppose 
summary judgment.  The Bankruptcy Court, at the Producers’ 
request, continued J. Aron and BP’s initial motions for 
summary judgment and gave the Producers an additional 
year of discovery.  Because there is no direct evidence of 
fraud, the Producers base their entire fraud claim on 
SemGroup’s business structure and its transactions with J. 
Aron and BP.  Yet all of this was the subject of discovery.  
The Producers addressed the fraud claims in oral argument 
before the Bankruptcy Court, and they have conducted 
numerous depositions and compiled documentary evidence 
that they now rely on in their effort to show fraud.    
 Moreover, even if we were to conclude there was 
insufficient notice or opportunity to develop the record, the 
Producers still have not shown prejudice.  They argue that 
they would have introduced expert affidavits “had they been 
given proper notice that J. Aron/BP were moving for 
summary judgment on all elements of all fraud claims.” 
Associated Producers Br. 51.  These experts merely ask us to 
infer fraud because J. Aron and BP knew SemGroup’s trading 
strategy was risky yet continued to trade options.  But these 
reports would not have defeated summary judgment.     
 J. Aron and BP never communicated with the 
Producers, so naturally they did not make any false 
statements to them.  As noted already, J. Aron and BP did not 
even know the identities of the thousands of producers that 
sold SemGroup the oil.  SemGroup, until the bankruptcy 
filing, always paid the Producers in full for the oil, and J. 
Aron and BP also always paid in full for the oil they 
purchased.   
 Despite the lack of evidence that anyone did not intend 
to pay for the oil, the Producers contend that SemGroup 
purchased the oil without intending to pay for it and J. Aron 
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and BP aided and abetted this fraudulent scheme.  But we fail 
to find one item of evidence indicating that SemGroup ever 
intended to avoid paying for oil.   
 The Producers never identify a time at which 
SemGroup started buying oil without an intent to pay or with 
a reckless disregard for its ability to do so.  The only evidence 
of SemGroup’s fraud comes from the Bankruptcy Examiner’s 
report, but it has nothing to do with SemGroup’s oil 
purchases.  Instead, it addresses certain SemGroup 
executives’ misconduct, which formed the basis of a 
shareholder lawsuit.  See In re SemCrude L.P., 796 F.3d 310 
(3d Cir. 2015).  And, if anything, the findings of the 
Examiner cut against fraud, as he concluded that SemGroup 
became insolvent because it kept losing on its options trades 
and that “[l]ast minute attempts by it to increase its credit 
facility failed.”  J.A. 869.  If SemGroup had successfully 
increased its credit facility and avoided bankruptcy, all 
evidence suggests that it would have paid the Producers. 
 Even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, 
that this evidence demonstrated that SemGroup defrauded the 
Producers, the evidence that J. Aron and BP conspired with 
SemGroup or aided and abetted this fraudulent scheme is still 
nonexistent.  A civil conspiracy requires a shared intent to 
commit fraud—a “meeting of the minds.”  See State ex rel. 
Mays v. Ridenhour, 811 P.2d 1220, 1226 (Kan. 1991); Cotten 
v. Weatherford Bancshares, Inc., 187 S.W.3d 687, 701 (Tex. 
App. 2006); Brock v. Thompson, 948 P.2d 279, 294 (Okla. 
1997), as corrected (Apr. 3, 1998).  Aiding and abetting 
requires, in addition to substantial assistance or participation, 
knowledge of the fraud.   See Mays, 811 P.2d at 1232; Cotten, 
187 S.W.3d at 701; Cooper v. Bondoni, 841 P.2d 608, 612 
(Okla. Civ. App. 1992).   
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 There simply is no evidence that either J. Aron or BP 
knew it was taking oil that had not been paid for.  Their mere 
knowledge that SemGroup purchased oil on credit, as was 
industry custom, does not suggest that they knew that any 
unidentified producers were still owed money or that 
SemGroup did not intend to pay for the oil when payment 
was due.  Again, J. Aron and BP were purchasing oil at large 
aggregation centers where oil mixed with the same 
commodity from myriad other producers in various states.  J. 
Aron and BP did not know that any of the millions of barrels 
of oil they purchased—to the extent it actually was the 
Producers’ oil (a point J. Aron and BP vigorously dispute)—
had not been paid for on the agreed payment date or that 
SemGroup did not intend to pay for it.  At most the 
purchases-on-credit arrangement that is industry custom 
allows for a reasonable inference that, when J. Aron and BP 
transacted with SemGroup, they may have known that 
SemGroup might still have owed the Producers.  However, no 
evidence leads to a reasonable inference that J. Aron and BP 
knew SemGroup intended to avoid paying for this oil or was 
reckless with its ability to pay for the oil.   
 The Producers also attempt to infer fraud from the 
options trades.  They contend that J. Aron and BP knew that 
SemGroup’s trading was speculative and not legitimate 
hedging, and thus, “[d]espite numerous concerns and red 
flags, no one from J. Aron or BP took reasonable steps to 
verify that this was a legitimate trading or hedging strategy,” 
all the while continuing to do business with SemGroup.  
Associated Producers Br. 56.  This lawful activity simply 
does not permit an inference of fraud.  
 J. Aron and BP paid millions in premiums up front for 
options to secure a price for oil, protecting themselves against 
an oil-price increase.  SemGroup bet the opposite—that oil 
prices would drop.  The prices kept rising, so SemGroup lost.  
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While this was a risky strategy that did not pay off, and in 
hindsight hedging might have served SemGroup better, this 
business arrangement does not demonstrate that J. Aron and 
BP intended to take the oil away from the Producers without 
payment.    
C. The Oklahoma Production Revenue Standards Act 
 Claims 
 The Oklahoma Producers separately argue that the 
Oklahoma Production Revenue Standards Act (the “PRSA”), 
Okla. Stat. tit. 52, §§ 570.1 et seq., creates an implied trust in 
their favor that, absent full payment, travels perpetually down 
the stream of commerce; in other words, so long as those 
Producers have not been paid, whoever possesses the oil does 
so for their benefit.8  In addition, the argument goes, so long 
as an Oklahoma Producer has not been paid, whoever owns 
the proceeds of the oil needs to account for those proceeds to 
that Producer.  Thus, even though downstream purchasers 
(like J. Aron) generally do not know the oil producers who 
sold the oil to the midstream purchasers, they allegedly have 
legal obligations to each Oklahoma Producer.  Based on these 
trust duties, that Producer may bring claims against J. Aron 
for conversion, unjust enrichment, constructive fraud, and 
declaratory relief.   
 Fortunately for J. Aron and anyone who has 
unwittingly filled a gas tank with Oklahoma-produced oil, 
                                              
8 There is a sound argument that the Oklahoma Producers 
waived their PRSA trust arguments by expressly disclaiming 
them in the District Court.  Nevertheless, in light of the 
importance of the legal questions at stake, we exercise our 
discretion to consider the issue despite the waiver.  Issa v. 
Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, 847 F.3d 121, 139 n.8 (3d Cir. 2017).   
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this interpretation simply fails the text of the statute.  First, 
whatever duties the PRSA creates, they do not apply to 
downstream purchasers like J. Aron.  The PRSA regulates the 
relationships of the many parties at the wellhead, which 
include the various interest owners and the operators of those 
wells.  Those interests are highly fractionalized and multiple 
persons may have a right to revenue from any well.  See Okla. 
Stat. tit. 52, § 570.2 (defining an “owner[’s]” interest, 
“proportionate production interest,” “royalty interest,” and 
“subsequently created interest”).   The Oklahoma Producers 
themselves might owe many obligations to the various 
interest owners of their production.   As there are numerous 
parties involved at the wellhead, the PRSA regulates all 
manner of these parties’ relationship, for example, dictating 
specific procedures for how proceeds of production are 
shared among interest owners and operators, id. § 570.4, the 
process for “[d]esignation of person[s] for certain royalt[ies], 
accounting and remittance functions,” id. § 570.5, detailed 
reporting requirements for all those involved at the wellhead, 
id. 570.8, and the “[i]nformation to be included with 
payments to [the] interest owner,” including how many 
decimals revenue should be calculated and the measurements 
to describe gas volume.  Id. § 570.12.   
 The PRSA, however, has no provisions relating to 
downstream purchasers.  Those purchasers could be located 
out of state, and, as in the case of J. Aron, could be so far 
removed from the wellhead they do not even know the 
identities of the producers or the interest owners those 
producers represent.  See Okla. Stat. tit. 52, § 570.2(1) 
(“‘Owner’ means a person or governmental entity with a legal 
interest in the mineral acreage under a well which entitles that 
person or entity to oil or gas production or the proceeds or 
revenues therefrom.”).  The statute simply does not govern 
the relationship of persons who later, down the line of 
commerce, repurchase this oil. 
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 Second, while the PRSA contains some language 
suggesting a trust-like relationship, there is no language 
stating that it creates an implied trust that travels perpetually 
down the stream of commerce.   PRSA § 570.10(a) states:  
All proceeds from the sale of production shall 
be regarded as separate and distinct from all 
other funds of any person receiving or holding 
the same until such time as such proceeds are 
paid to the owners legally entitled thereto. Any 
person holding revenue or proceeds from the 
sale of production shall hold such revenue or 
proceeds for the benefit of the owners legally 
entitled thereto. Nothing in this subsection shall 
create an express trust. 
Okla. Stat. tit. 52, § 570.10(a).   
 The Oklahoma Producers rely on a 2008 Oklahoma 
Attorney General Opinion that concluded the language 
“owners legally entitled” to proceeds of the oil actually meant 
“implied beneficiaries,” and therefore “[t]he holder of the 
revenue or proceeds of oil and gas production acquires no 
right, title or interest in such revenue or proceeds.”  2008 OK 
AG 31 ¶ 22 (citations omitted).  The Bankruptcy Court 
rejected the Attorney General’s interpretation, and so have an 
Oklahoma intermediate appellate court and District Courts in 
Oklahoma.  See In re SemCrude, L.P., et al., 407 B.R. 140, 
155 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); Gaskins v. Texon, LP, 321 P.3d 
985, 989 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014); Naylor Farms, Inc. v. 
Anadarko OGC Co., 2011 WL 7267853, at *1 (W.D. Okla. 
June 23, 2011); McKnight v. Linn Operating, Inc., No. CIV-
10-30-R, 2010 WL 9039794, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 1, 
2010).  We agree.   
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 Although the PRSA’s language—that sale proceeds 
“shall be regarded as separate and distinct” and shall be held 
for the benefit of the owners “legally entitled thereto”— 
echoes trust language, these words cannot be stretched to 
create automatically an implied trust.  First, it is a conceptual 
leap to take the language “paid to the owners legally entitled 
thereto” to mean that interest owners and producers 
automatically possess the “legal entitlement” of ownership of 
a beneficial interest in the proceeds, and that whoever 
actually holds the proceeds has no title to them.  As the 
Bankruptcy Court noted, in the few instances where 
Oklahoma statutes have been construed to create an implied 
trust, those statutes imposed many more trust duties.  See 407 
B.R. at 152 (“[Those other statutes] demonstrated the 
requisite clear intent to form a trust because the State of 
Oklahoma (or an organ thereof) is the trustee, holding 
identified funds, for the benefit of identified beneficiaries. In 
sharp contrast, the PRSA does not identify a specific trustee, 
actually require segregation of a trust res or otherwise impose 
rights and duties typically associated with a 
trustee/beneficiary relationship.”).  
 Second, a more faithful interpretation of the PRSA is 
that it provides for the imposition of a trust only in limited 
ways.  As the concluding sentence of PRSA § 570.10(a) 
states, “Nothing in this subsection shall create an express 
trust.”  In contrast to an express trust, implied trusts arise in 
Oklahoma where it would be inequitable for one party to keep 
title to property.  There are two types of implied trusts—
resulting or constructive.  A resulting trust may be judicially 
imposed “where the circumstances indicate that the grantor of 
legal title to property did not intend for the beneficial interest 
to be enjoyed by the grantee of the legal title.” Gaskins, 321 
P.3d at 989 n.5 (citation omitted).  A constructive trust may 
be imposed “when an individual obtains a legal right to 
property through fraudulent, abusive means, or through a 
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method which violates equity and good conscience.”  Id.  
(citation omitted).  In either case, equity or good conscience 
could require imposing trustee burdens on a party who 
violated a duty owed to another under the PRSA.  However, 
the Oklahoma Producers do not argue that equity demands 
imposition of a trust, but only rely on the Attorney General’s 
interpretation that the PRSA automatically implies a trust.   
 Finally, the Oklahoma Producers argue that the 
legislature “restated” that the PRSA created trust rights when 
it passed the 2010 Oklahoma Lien Act.  This new Act created 
automatic oil liens in favor of producers that are outside the 
scope of the U.C.C.  See Sahar Jooshani, There’s A New Act 
in Town: How the Oklahoma Oil and Gas Owners’ Lien Act 
of 2010 Strengthens the Position of Oklahoma Interest 
Owners, 65 Okla. L. Rev. 133 (2012); Alvin C. Harrell and 
Frederick H. Miller, Aftermath of the SemGroup Case: 
Oklahoma Enacts the Oil and Gas Owners’ Lien Act of 
2010, 81 Okla. Bar Assoc. J. 2818 (2010).   
 The 2010 Lien Act does not apply to our appeal 
because it post-dated SemGroup’s bankruptcy.  Yet the 
Oklahoma Producers point to it as evidence that the 
Oklahoma Legislature believed the PRSA created 
automatically an implied trust.  The Lien Act includes buyer 
defenses for the liens it creates, which also apply to PRSA 
§ 570.10(a): if the downstream purchasers were buyers in the 
ordinary course or had paid all consideration due, they take 
free of “any obligations created by [the PRSA].”  Okla. Stat. 
tit. 52, § 549.6.  The logic is that if the Oklahoma Legislature 
did not believe that the PRSA creates trust rights, the 2010 
Lien Act would not have included buyer defenses to the 
PRSA.  However, our take is that to the extent an implied 
trust could be imposed under PRSA § 570.10(a), all the 
Oklahoma Legislature made clear was that downstream 
purchasers could avail themselves of buyer defenses.   
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 In summary, the PRSA did not create an implied trust 
here and did not impose any duties on J. Aron.  As all the 
Oklahoma Producers’ theories of relief were predicated on 
this construal of the Act, the District Court correctly entered 
summary judgment against the Oklahoma Producers. 
* * * * * 
 Texas, Kansas, and Oklahoma all include statutes that 
provide some protections for those who produce oil in their 
States, but those protections do not reach downstream parties 
like J. Aron and BP.  The Producers theoretically could have 
perfected their security interests, traced those interests in the 
oil that extended to their accounts receivable, and forbade 
SemGroup from using those accounts as margin collateral for 
their options trades.   
 But why didn’t the Producers take such precautions?  
They contend they are a loose collection of relatively 
unsophisticated parties.  However, these parties pool their 
interests and choose operators to extract and sell their oil; it 
does not seem farfetched that they could also choose a 
representative to file financing statements to perfect security 
interests or take other measures to protect against an oil 
purchaser’s insolvency.  The more likely explanation is that 
no midstream or downstream oil purchaser would buy oil 
from the Producers if they sought to encumber that oil as it 
flowed through interstate commerce and changed hands. 
 The oil industry operates through sales on credit.  It 
involves thousands of producers and those producers 
represent countless interest owners who have fractionalized 
interests at the well.  Downstream purchasers have no contact 
with these producers and do not even know who they are.  
This oil is pooled with myriad other producers’ oil and is 
resold many times before consumers get it at the retail pump.  
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The industry thus uses the Conoco warranty that this oil is 
sold free and clear of any liens because it is a hard-to-trace, 
liquid asset that flows throughout the country.   
 In sum, if any producer of oil tries to sell it subject to a 
security interest or implied trust that flows endlessly down the 
stream of commerce, it will be unsold.  The Producers’ 
contention that a lien or trust follows oil from their wells to 
the gas pump does not make sense for this type of market.  
The effect of any opinion from us upholding the Producers’ 
positions would be chaos.  We thus affirm the superbly 
reasoned rulings of both the Bankruptcy and District Courts.    
